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Operational Leadership:
A Case of General Helmuth von Moltke (The Younger)

By

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Abstract

Operational Leadership: A Case of General Helmuth von Moltke (The Younger)

Operational leadership is of critical importance to the military, especially in times of warfare, but it is difficult to define; and it is even more difficult to describe the essential characteristics of a successful operational commander. What works in peacetime does not necessarily work in wartime. However, the writings on the subject of leadership always include four traits which we can deduce as the essential characteristics of all successful operational leaders. The four essential traits are: boldness, perseverance, flexibility and decisiveness.

Using the operational leadership of General Helmuth von Moltke (The Younger) as a case study, we can review the significance of these four traits to his operational leadership.

Preface

In time of war the operational commander is the nexus at which national strategy and policy intersect with the capabilities of the military organization, and upon the operational commander's shoulders rests the primary responsibility for success or failure of the nation's war plans. The great operational commander is able to bear the weight of this responsibility, in victory or in defeat, by drawing on strength of character that most of us do not possess. When this weight is placed on the shoulders of a commander not suited for such a burden, he will eventually collapse under the pressure.

There is a significant difference between wartime and peacetime operational leadership. The primary responsibility of the wartime leader is to plan, prepare, and conduct campaigns and major operations, and specifically to "conduct the estimate of the situation and make decisions,"¹ normally under duress, requiring prior experience and significant operational expertise. The peacetime operational commander is responsible more for administrative and management tasks such as recruiting, training, budgeting, acquisition, and supply and planning, for which organizational, administrative and diplomatic skills are more appropriate.

Unfortunately operational commanders who are selected based on their qualifications for leadership in peacetime often make poor wartime leaders, and vice versa. It is a mistake to assume that the outstanding peacetime military leader will *de facto* be adequate as a wartime operational commander.

The objective of this paper is to analyze what specific traits of the operational commander are most critical to success in wartime and show that their impact affects the strategic, operational and tactical levels of command. The main focus will be analyzing the

operational leadership characteristics of General Helmuth von Moltke (The Younger) in his execution of the Schlieffen Plan; and to draw conclusions about the impact that his personal characteristics had on his degree of success as an operational commander.

I. Theoretical Framework

The operational commander's job is to translate national military strategy into a coherent operational plan capable of being carried out by the military. To accomplish this he needs intelligence and creativity, as well as professional training and experience, and a thorough understanding and appreciation of the capabilities of the military forces and the objectives of national strategy and policy. He also must be a leader.

Effective leadership is easy to recognize, but difficult to define. As General George S. Patton, Jr., once commented, "Leadership is the thing that wins battles. I have it—but I'll be damned if I can define it."² Despite the elusive nature of leadership, most experts are agreed on certain basic qualities of the operational commander. These include boldness, courage, perseverance, creativity, professional knowledge, decisiveness, flexibility, good judgment, and high intellect. Although each of these qualities is important to the success of the operational commander in wartime, the presence or absence of four of these qualities—boldness, perseverance, flexibility and decisiveness—seem to make or break wartime leaders more assuredly than any of the other factors. Combined, these four elements of leadership comprise an individual's *strength of character*, which Napoleon I called, "the most essential quality of a general...."³ The most successful operational commanders intuitively incorporate these traits in the design and execution of their plans.

Boldness. Boldness is the first prerequisite for military greatness⁴; the operational commander is caught in a struggle between using the audacity he knows will succeed, and the

measured caution he has acquired from years of experience. If he is able to retain his sense of daring and incorporate it into his war plans, he who will have the advantage, for “whenever boldness encounters timidity, it is likely to be the winner.”⁵ Boldness seems to be a natural rather than acquired personality trait, for “No man who is not born bold can play such a role.”⁶

Perseverance. Perseverance is the determination to carry through an action despite the pressures urging against it. The quality of perseverance must be based on the operational commander’s confidence in his own knowledge and judgment. When this self-confidence wanes, so does perseverance. Perseverance is most critical to the operational commander in the execution of a major operation or campaign, when he is bombarded by conflicting information, as well as by the fog and friction of war. Under these circumstances, the operational commander who doubts his own ability to design a plan that is sound and realistic will surrender to his emotional responses and lose confidence either in his plan or in his own judgment. Perseverance does not equate to obstinacy. An operational commander will be able to persevere if he is confident that the plan he developed for achieving an objective is realistic and achievable, despite the set-backs he encounters in the actual execution of the plan. Perseverance can only be taught to the degree that leaders are given the chance to practice making plans, and then carry them out. In so doing, the leaders of tomorrow reinforce their confidence in their own judgment and ability.

Flexibility. It must be considered what happens when the fog and friction of war conspire against the best-laid plan of the operational commander, making the military objective of the of the operational plan unattainable. At this point both the operational commander and his plan must be flexible enough to change with the situation. Flexibility and perseverance will always be in conflict. A wise operational commander “is able to recognize changing

circumstances and...act expediently, [gaining] victory by seizing opportunity without hesitation.”⁷ The successful operational commander will keep a vision of the desired end state in mind as well as his own plan, allowing him the flexibility to use all means available to him rather than be a slave to a fixed, prepared plan.⁸ Flexibility can be developed and refined through years of experience. It can be taught, but for the operational commander in wartime it usually requires past combat experience since there is little opportunity in peacetime to experience the chaotic situations that can occur in war.

Decisiveness. Decisiveness is a balancing act between perseverance, boldness and flexibility. Like flexibility, it is less a factor of innate ability, and more a result of training and experience. It is also heavily dependent on strength of character. Under pressure of combat, an insecure, self-doubting operational commander faced with conflicting information will have difficulty making a decision simply because he doubts his own judgment, intelligence, knowledge or experience. The worst thing an operational commander can do is to vacillate between alternatives and not make a decision; nearly as bad is the operational commander who makes his decision too late to have an impact.

II. Historical Framework

Helmuth Johannes Ludwig von Moltke, known as von Moltke (The Younger) to distinguish him from his famous uncle, was born in 1848 in Gersdorff, Mecklenburg in the north of Germany. The mid-nineteenth and early twentieth centuries were an era of social change. Leadership of the military, which had been the sole province of European aristocracy until this point, was giving way to the professional soldier whose promotion was awarded based on merit rather than social status. Von Moltke (The Younger) was of the latter category, promoted more because of his social standing than his performance and qualifications as a

military leader.

Being named for Field Marshal Helmuth von Moltke (The Elder), was a heavy burden for the nephew who adored his erudite uncle, but lacked the military genius for which his family was most renown. He seemed always to be in his uncle's shadow, never able to live up to the famous von Moltke name. Growing up with daily reminders of one's inadequacy will cause most people to doubt not only their self-confidence, but also their self-worth. These feelings haunted the younger von Moltke throughout his life and were a source of great anguish for him, especially in his generalship of the opening days of World War I.

Moltke was an intelligent, pleasant, reflective man, the latter of which traits, Napoleon I ascribed to a man who "would not be able to carry through [a] concept with the single-minded vigor and boldness that were the essential...."⁹ As was expected of a Moltke, he was classically educated for army service; yet this vocation was something of a mismatch for a man who preferred conciliation to confrontation. In his youth he held a distinguished combat record as a lieutenant of grenadiers in the Franco-Prussian War in 1870, but most of his remaining military service before World War I was in administrative and staff positions. These assignments included study at the *Kriegsakademie* [War College] from 1875-1878, assignment as a staff officer on the Great General Staff (1880-1882), service as adjutant to von Moltke (The Elder) (1882-1891) and as Aide-de-Camp for Kaiser Wilhelm II (1893), during which time he gained the Kaiser's confidence and friendship. As nephew to Field Marshal von Moltke and friend to the Kaiser, the younger von Moltke was subsequently appointed to a series of impressive "figure-head" positions before being selected for service on the Great General Staff in 1906. It was never said of him, however, that he was an aspiring or particularly capable leader.¹⁰

When Count Alfred von Schlieffen retired as Chief of the Great General Staff in 1906, Kaiser Wilhelm II nominated General von Moltke for the position. His personal friendship with the Kaiser was the primary reason for his nomination; it has also been said that the pedantic and vainglorious Wilhelm II chose von Moltke out of a desire to couple his name with yet another Moltke military leader, like his grandfather, Wilhelm I, whose armies were led to victory by von Moltke (The Elder) during the Wars of German Unification. Moltke himself protested that he was not qualified for the position. "I lack the power of rapid decision," he is reported to have told Prince Bernhard von Bülow. "I am too reflective...too conscientious for such a post. I lack the capacity for risking all on a single throw...."¹¹

Whatever the Kaiser's reasons were for nominating him, it is clear that von Moltke was not the choice of the War Ministry who sent the Kaiser a memorandum detailing von Moltke's inadequacies, among which were laziness, lack of self-confidence, lethargy and his inclination to be bogged down in details. Von Moltke was also opposed by his military peers who were suspicious of the paunchy, artistic general who played the cello, and kept falling off his horse in front of the troops.¹² In all, it can be surmised that von Moltke was far less qualified for the job of Chief of the Great General Staff than those he was selected over.

III. The Schlieffen Plan

As Chief of the Great General Staff, von Moltke inherited the 1905 Schlieffen Plan, the war plan developed by his predecessor as the primary strategy for attaining Germany's objective of hegemony in Europe. To achieve hegemony, Germany had to defeat its greatest rival, France. Knowing that Russia would attack Germany's eastern flank if a war broke out with France, and realizing that they could not win a two-front war, Count von Schlieffen, devised a plan to destroy France with a quick, decisive victory before Russia could

adequately mobilize for war in the east. Following the defeat of France, the bulk of Germany's military forces would then be transferred to East Prussia to defeat the Russian forces there. For additional information refer to the map at Appendix A that compares the movements proposed in the original Schlieffen Plan with the actual movements of the German armies in August 1914.

The attack on France was based on outflanking the French on two sides as Hannibal had done at Cannae¹³ in 216 B.C. Two flanks of the German Army would penetrate France through Holland, Luxembourg and Belgium. While the left flank formed at Alsace-Lorraine where the French were believed most likely to attack, the right flank would swing northwest, around Paris, and then fold back in upon the rear of the French forces, enveloping and crushing them against the forces of the German left flank. The key to success of the Schlieffen Plan was in its shocking swiftness and audacity in attacking and quickly defeating France. The sheer boldness of the plan was its primary strength, since the German forces were not sufficiently superior in number to fight and win a two-front war. Schlieffen was adamant that the right flank forces not be weakened in order for the boldness of the plan to work. "Such risks required iron nerve on the part of the Plan's executor,"¹⁴ to be successful. Unfortunately for Germany, the Kaiser had selected Moltke to execute the plan.

It is pertinent to note that the Schlieffen Plan had a number of erroneous assumptions, including the use of forces that were not actually in being, marching down roads that didn't exist, and meeting railroad timetables with no concern for the fog or friction of war. The plan left no room for error.¹⁵ Schlieffen and the General Staff based the plan on a number of erroneous assumptions which might well have resulted in failure of the plan. They assumed Belgium would offer little protest or resistance to German troops invading their territory and

England would remain neutral. They also assumed that Russia would take at least six weeks to mobilize in the east,¹⁶ giving them the time they needed to first defeat France with a quick, decisive victory.

IV. The Opening Days of World War I

As Chief of the Great General Staff from 1906 to 1914, Moltke became convinced that a major confrontation between the European powers was inevitable. He believed the conflict would not be solved by the single decisive battle for which the Schlieffen Plan was developed, but rather would, “become a long, exhausting struggle against a country that will not admit defeat until the whole strength of its people is broken.”¹⁷ Yet, despite his vision of the future war, von Moltke failed to use his position as Chief of the Great General Staff to prepare the German military for this possibility. Instead he simply adopted the Schlieffen Plan, making certain modifications designed to update the plan for the current environment.

Historians criticize von Moltke (The Younger) for having watered-down the Schlieffen Plan by incorporating too much caution into it. What von Moltke did was to cause imbalance in the ratio of forces between the right and left flanks, not by weakening the right flank, but by strengthening the left out of proportion. Lacking in combat expertise, the ever-cautious von Moltke was worried that the French army might actually be able to break through the German left flank before they could be encircled. What he failed to perceive was that the left flank *must* remain weak enough to fall back, even giving up some of the territory of the Rhine if necessary, in order to draw the French forces farther away from their sources of supply and give the forces on the right flank the space and time needed to envelope the French army.¹⁸

A less obvious criticism of von Moltke is that, during his nine years as Chief of Staff, he neglected to develop a realistic defense plan for Germany in the event that the Schlieffen Plan failed. Von Moltke should have realized that the Schlieffen Plan was a tremendous gamble for which prudence would require a defensive back-up plan. Yet, he and his staff neglected to plan for such alternatives.

Had von Moltke had the courage of his convictions that the imminent conflict was to be a protracted war, he would more logically have cautioned against using the Schlieffen Plan at all. Rather than simply bowing to the greater military knowledge of his predecessor, he should have proposed that Germany adopt a defensive strategy against a two-front war. But the societal and political climate and the inflexible nature of mobilization plans would have been a formidable hurdle to leap over, and von Moltke's own self-doubt and in-bred caution blinded him to the possibility that he could and should propose an alternative plan for Germany. Yet, even had he proposed a defensive strategy, the Kaiser's irrational hopes for German hegemony in Europe would have spelled doomed for any other proposal.

V. Fog and Friction

General von Moltke's operational leadership in the critical opening days of World War I lacked boldness and decisiveness, and was also characterized by inflexibility. Insecure in his own knowledge and abilities, his leadership failures resulted in inadequate, untimely and unclear decisions during the critical first days of the war that contributed significantly to the loss of the war for Germany.

Both Schlieffen and Moltke agreed that invasion of France through Belgium was the only way the Schlieffen Plan would work since the French border was too well fortified. Had Schlieffen or Moltke listened to the German Foreign Ministry, they would have learned that

the invasion of Belgian neutrality would result in world reaction and fierce opposition by Belgium itself. Instead General von Moltke, and even Belgium's allies, were taken by surprise when the Belgians put up fierce resistance.

In 1914 the Schlieffen Plan and its operational commander were put to the ultimate test. On June 28, 1914, Archduke Francis Ferdinand, heir apparent to the Austro-Hungarian throne, was assassinated in Sarajevo by members of a Serbian Nationalists organization. This event was the lighted match thrown into the powder keg of a Europe replete with international enmity and complex web of alliances. It sparked the declaration of war between Austria-Hungary and Russia, and the subsequent declarations of war between their respective allies, Germany and France. In reality, this event was simply the excuse Germany had been waiting for to launch an attack on France and begin her quest for European hegemony.

Heedless of the years of planning that had gone into every detail of the Schlieffen Plan, and the years he spent hoping for just such a confrontation, Germany's Kaiser Wilhelm II was suddenly reticent to leap into this war. General von Moltke knew that the timetables of the Schlieffen Plan provided a very narrow window for mobilization to begin in order to retain the advantage of surprise over France. He became agitated and frustrated when the Kaiser began casting left and right for some excuse not to invade France. If the mobilization plans were not put into effect in a timely manner, the entire campaign would be doomed; yet the Kaiser seemed oblivious to the need for decisive action. Twice Moltke broke down in tears of frustration before he was able to finally convince the Kaiser to give the order for mobilization.

On August 4, 1914, the first German troops crossed into Belgium where they met with unexpected Belgian resistance. But by August 16, despite the fierce resistance of Belgium's armies and citizens, the city and fortress of Liège succumbed to the German forces, thus opening the way for Schlieffen's invasion force to enter France.

Once in France, the German left and right flanks proceeded according to the Schlieffen Plan. On the left flank the German First, Second and Third Armies swung as far west as possible; but the tension created by trying to keep the movements of these three armies synchronized threatened to cause a gap between the forces, into which the French might drive a wedge if given the chance. Faced with this alternative, Moltke's determination had already begun to waiver and he gave tacit approval to the right flank commanders to swing south, far short of the planned goal of skirting the western edge of Paris.

As reports reached the *Oberste Heeresleitung* (The Army Supreme Headquarters, or OHL) that the battle was proceeding better than expected, Prince Rupprecht, commander of the Fourth Army of the right flank, requested authorization to administer a crushing blow against the French troops rather than simply hold them from breaking through the German lines. General von Moltke could not resist the sirens' song of the full encirclement that all good German military officers longed for. Violating Clausewitz' warning to the military leader to "sacrifice nonessentials for the sake of essentials,"¹⁹ he broke with the Schlieffen Plan and approved the counter-attack, abandoning the essential *hammer and anvil* maneuver of the Schlieffen Plan, in favor of the full envelopment.

Partly due to the inadequacy of the *French Plan XVII*, which was purely an offensive strategy with no room for defensive operations, and partly due to the lack of cooperation between the French, British and Belgian forces, German forces secured a significant victory

in the Battle of Mons on August 23, 1914. The battle was so successful that von Moltke misinterpreted it as the culminating point of German victory over the French Army.

General von Moltke had committed his first critical error—thinking that the quick, decisive victory had already been won. Believing the campaign in France to be a *fait accompli*, General von Moltke made his second grievous error by succumbing to the pressure for more troops at the eastern front to counter the Russians who had mobilized more quickly than expected, and were already invading East Prussia. Thinking the campaign in the west to be won, General von Moltke decided to move two corps from the western front to reinforce the Eighth Army on the eastern front at Tannenberg. Apart from the obvious oversight that these two corps could not reach Tannenberg in time to make a difference where they weren't really needed, General von Moltke's more significant misjudgment was in taking away forces from the right flank of the Schlieffen Plan which less than a month later might have meant the difference between victory and defeat at the Battle of the Marne.

VI. Chaos

Despite the perceived victory at Mons, “Gloomy Julius”, as the Kaiser playfully referred to von Moltke to describe his perennially pessimistic outlook, could not celebrate for long. On the eastern front the breakdown in communications and the overly cautious leadership of Lieutenant General Max von Prittwitz und Gaffron, commander of the Eighth Army, presaged the loss of East Prussia to the Russians. Oppressively worried about both the western and now the eastern front, Moltke was at an emotional breaking point. Communications breakdown between his Army commanders and the Supreme Army Headquarters led the Army commanders to begin making uncoordinated troop movements.

The lack of unity of effort presented France with their opportunity for victory, which General Joffre was quick to exploit.²⁰

Becoming overwhelmed by the details and complexity of waging war on two fronts, von Moltke was not thinking clearly when news came to the OHL of General Prittwitz's decision to retreat from Gumbinnen. Had von Moltke been more experienced and therefore more secure in his own assessment of the situation, he would have issued a counter-order to Prittwitz' order for retreat. But the weight of his command was seriously affecting his judgment, and he failed to give the counter-order. To his credit, he quickly replaced Prittwitz with the indomitable team of General Paul von Hindenburg as Commander of the Eighth Army, and General Erich Ludendorff as his Chief of Staff. Aided by the poor senior Russian leadership and a disorganized, seriously depleted and half-starving enemy in General Aleksandr Samsonov's Russian army, the German offensive in Tannenberg ended in success.

Even still, General Moltke continued to be distracted. The details of the western front, his skepticism over the French retreat, the unforeseen difficulties in repairing the demolished railroad system which thus impacted the re-supply of his forward-deployed troops, the constant struggle for power between his generals, the poor communications on both fronts, all weighed down the already disheartened operational commander, causing him to lose all confidence in his own judgment, and making him even more cautious and indecisive.

General Moltke's most grievous error, and the one that ultimately resulted in his relief of command, occurred on September 13 when he sent a relatively junior staff officer, Lieutenant Colonel Richard Hentsch, to the western front with authorization to make operational-level decisions regarding the campaign there. "In a moment of Wagnerian fantasy," Moltke sent Hentsch to assess the situation and, "...to co-ordinate a retreat 'should rearward movements

have been initiated.”²¹ Out of inexperience, Hentsch misjudged the situation and gave the fateful order for the First and Second Armies to withdraw from the Marne just at the point when the French were ready to retreat.

VII. Von Moltke's Relief

Having failed to defeat the French with the quick, decisive victory, there was nothing left for Germany but to settle in for the protracted war that von Moltke had predicted would come. On September 12 von Moltke gave the order to the First, Second, and Third armies to entrench themselves north of the Aisne River, beginning a pattern of mutual slaughter that was to last for the rest of the War. On September 14, General von Moltke received a letter from Kaiser Wilhelm II informing him that he was considered too ill to continue as Chief of the General Staff.²² Although General Erich von Falkenhayn relieved him of all duties, von Moltke was not formally relieved of his command until November 3, ostensibly to avoid disheartening the German forces by the relief of their commander immediately following the defeat at the Marne.

Conclusions

The Schlieffen Plan and Moltke's execution of it provide excellent examples of why operational commanders sometimes fail. In 1914 Germany had a chance to achieve her goal of European hegemony if she could defeat France and Russia. But General Moltke was not the operational commander for the task. He lacked boldness, perseverance, flexibility and decisiveness—the traits that most successful military leaders possess.

The Schlieffen Plan was too rigid and inflexible. It was written for a specific situation at a specific time, leaving little to chance. Both Schlieffen and Moltke ignored the fact that the invading Belgium's neutrality would outrage the world, incense Belgium to fierce resistance,

and pull England into the war. To their narrow way of thinking, the plan had already been developed, and it was too difficult to change it simply for what they viewed as a “technicality”. Both Schlieffen and Moltke neglected to consider what would happen if the Russia army, their more formidable foe, were able to mobilize on the eastern front before their campaign in France was successful. As history has proven, this was an egregious oversight. Nonetheless, in 1914 the Schlieffen Plan came very close to achieving its goal, and the primary cause for its failure was the operational commander—General Moltke.

General Moltke knew that he was not qualified to be Chief of the Great German Staff. He lacked self-confidence, primarily because of the insecurity he had felt from a lifetime of living in the shadow of his famous uncle, but also because he was “too reflective” as he himself said. He was inexperienced in operational matters and believed he was not qualified to make the decisions for which he was called upon to make.

Boldness is the most important asset of an operational commander. It is the element of character that Moltke most lacked, not because of his inexperience in battle, but because he was inherently cautious. He over-strengthened the left wing of the Schlieffen Plan out of caution. He also transferred the two divisions of the right wing in France to the Russian front out of caution. Moltke could not be the bold leader that the Schlieffen Plan called for because he it was not in his nature to fall back on instinct when making decisions, as the bold leader must do.

Moltke also lacked perseverance, a quality that relies heavily on the operational commander’s confidence in his own abilities and in the soundness of his plan. Because of his basic insecurities, Moltke had deep-seated doubts about both the Schlieffen Plan and his own ability to make wise military decisions. Lacking confidence in the Schlieffen Plan is the

reason he allowed his right-wing commanders to alter their westward movement and begin their premature southward swing that ultimately allowed the French and English forces to attack at their flank. Lacking confidence in his own judgment is the reason why he sent Lieutenant Colonel Hentsch to the western front, instead of going himself, to assess the situation and give “marching orders” to the generals there.

The inflexibility of the Schlieffen Plan was compounded by Moltke’s own inability to see alternate ways of solving the problem. Moltke relied so heavily on the accuracy of his war plan that he was not able to make appropriate changes when the plan no longer worked. When Russia began attacking East Prussia before the Germany had secured victory over France, Moltke began to panic. His strategic vision was limited to the boundaries of the war plan. Moltke should have realized that Germany must trade space in East Prussia to gain the time needed to defeat France. Instead he felt that he must cling inflexibly to the limitations of the Schlieffen Plan.

Moltke’s lack of decisiveness was a classic example of why the insecure, overly reflective man cannot be an effective operational commander. When communications broke down between Supreme Army Headquarters and the generals on the eastern and western fronts, Moltke fell into a panic. His reflective and pensive mind required an infusion of information, and time to absorb the situation and mull over the options before making a decision. Lacking sufficient amounts of information, Moltke did not have enough confidence in his own judgment to make a decision, right or wrong. Needing a decision either one way or the other, the field commanders began making their own decisions. The uncoordinated movements of the various armies on both the eastern and western fronts created

vulnerabilities in their defenses which the opposing forces were able to exploit to their advantage and ultimate victory over the German armies.


Lessons Learned

The importance of picking the right operational commander for the job is crucial to the success of the campaign. The individual who is inherently cautious and overly reflective will not be successful as a leader in the high-stress, quick-response situations of combat. The military needs to determine what the qualitative standards are for operational leadership, and must be able to identify valid measures of effectiveness for this. In peacetime it is difficult to measure how an individual will react under actual combat situations. War games provide an artificial climate that cannot effectively simulate the stress and horror of war, and therefore this type of training results in inaccurate estimates of an individual's ability to make appropriate wartime decisions at the operational level. More realistic wartime simulation exercises need to be developed to actually test the performance of officers in these positions of leadership.

To some degree leaders are born, not made. The boldness that is required in combat cannot be learned. Yet the "zero-defect" mentality of today's military actually suppresses the boldness of its members. The military must reconsider how to continue to nurture the boldness of its members within the limitations of peacetime. For the United States, this includes an education campaign for the non-military public that not only clarifies the difference between management in peacetime and leadership in wartime, but also reminds the public of the need for eternal vigilance, and the requirement for a qualified military force of warriors rather than administrators.

APPENDIX A

The Schlieffen Plan



NOTES

- ¹ Milan N. Vego, *Operational Warfare* (Newport, RI: Naval War College), 579.
- ¹ George S. Patton, quoted in Werner W. Banisch, “Leadership at the Operational Level” *Army* 8 (August 1987), 51.
- ¹ Jay Luvaas, ed., *Napoleon on the Art of War*, (New York: The Free Press 1999), 66.
- ¹ Carl von Clausewitz, *On War*, Edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1976), 192.
- ¹ Ibid., 190.
- ¹ Ibid., 192.
- ¹ Sun Tzu, *The Art of War*, translated by Samuel B. Griffith, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1971) 65.
- ¹ Phillip L. Brinkley, “The Operational Commander’s Will: An Intangible Element in Victory” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 16 May 1986), 2.
- ¹ T. N. Dupuy, *A Genius for War* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentis-Hall, Inc. 1977) 140.
- ¹ Otto Friedrich, *Blood and Iron: From Bismarck to Hitler the von Moltke Family’s Impact on German History* (New York: HarperCollins Publishers 1995), 230.
- ¹ Ibid., 227.
- ¹ Ibid., 230
- ¹ T. N. Dupuy, *A Genius for War* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentis-Hall, Inc. 1977) 133.
- ¹ Forrest S. Holmes, Jr. “The Schlieffen Plan: Case History of the Relation of Military Strategy to National Security Policy” (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1972) 14.
- ¹ William Jannen, Jr. *The Lions of July* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1996) 160.
- ¹ Tuchman, *The Guns of August*, 73.
- ¹ Friedrich, *Blood and Iron*, 229.
- ¹ Holmes, “The Schlieffen Plan,” 13.

NOTES

¹ Clausewitz, *On War*, 197.

¹ Kenneth Macksey, *Why the Germans Lose at War: The Myth of German Military Superiority* (London, England: Greenhill Books, 1996) 45.

¹ Ibid., 45.

¹ Ibid., 94.

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